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AYENI V. MOTTOLA" AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF
CHARACTERIZING VIDEOTAPING AS A FOURTH
AMENDMENT SEIZURE
INTRODUCTION

Real-life television series have become increasingly
popular in the last decade. These shows feature camera crews
accompanying public servants in their daily work police officers pursuing suspects; firefighters fighting three-alarm fires;
and emergency medical technicians resuscitating those pulled
from train wrecks. The Second Circuit, in an apparent check
on the proliferation of such shows, recently has limited the
ability of camera crews to accompany police officers executing
search warrants.
In Ayeni v. Mottola,' the Second Circuit imposed personal
liability on a secret service agent, James Mottola, for inviting a
camera crew to film the execution of a validly issued search
warrant.2 Agent Mottola had asked a camera crew from the
now-defunct CBS television series Street Stories to accompany
him while he searched the home of Babatunde Ayeni, a man
suspected of credit card fraud? After procuring a warrant,
Mottola and the camera crew went to the Ayeni home where
the crew videotaped the search, the inside of the Ayeni home
and Babatunde Ayeni's wife and son.4
The Second Circuit held that Mottola violated clearly established fourth amendment principles by inviting the camera
crew to come with him and that he could not have reasonably
believed that his actions were lawful.' The coures conclusion

. 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995). In order to

avoid confusion, the circuit court opinion will be cited as Aycni H and the district
court opinion, reported at 813 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), will be cited as Ayeni L
1 Ayeni 1I, 35 F.3d 680.

2

Id. at 683.

3Id.
'Id. It was they who subsequently brought suit against blottola. Id.
6 Id. at 689.
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was based partially on the assertion that videotaping is a seizure in fourth amendment terms.6 This Comment will argue
that the characterization of videotaping as a seizure is incorrect, and needlessly perpetuates a split among the circuit
courts.
Part I of this Comment provides the background for the
Ayeni decision by briefly surveying the United States Supreme
Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence and reviewing the
position of each circuit court that has decided the issue of
whether videotaping effects a fourth amendment seizure. The
Second and Fourth Circuits hold that a videotaping is a seizure while the Sixth Circuit holds that it is not. Part II reviews the facts of Ayeni and the decisions of the district and
circuit courts, focusing on the rationale that these courts provide for the conclusion that videotaping constitutes a fourth
amendment seizure.
Part Ill of this Comment argues that this conclusion is illconceived. This Part illustrates the flaws in such a characterization by identifying the negative and absurd consequences
for law enforcement that flow therefrom. Effective law enforcement will be undermined if videotaping is disallowed as an
impermissible fourth amendment seizure because police will
have to forgo warrantless video-surveillance even in public
places. Part III then argues that this issue can be better resolved by adopting the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that videotaping is not a seizure but a search. Such a characterization is
consistent with precedent and does not needlessly fetter police.
I. BACKGROUND: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment is laden with interpretive difficulties.' It acknowledges that some limits must be placed upon
government in its efforts to enforce laws, but leaves the contours of those limits undefined.8 The amendment provides that
6 Id. at 688.

PoLYVIOUs
LAW 91 (1982).

G. POLYVIOU, SEARCH & SEIZURE: CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON

' POLYVIOU, supra note 7, at 91. See also Akbil Reed Amar, Fourth Amend.

ment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994); Carol S. Steilter, Second
Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994). The Fourth
Amendment applies only to searches and seizures conducted by the government.

1951
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

What searches and seizures are-in short, what values are
protected by the Fourth Amendment-has been difficult to
ascertain.
In its first thorough discussion of the Fourth Amendment,
the Supreme Court described the values protected by the
amendment thus:
[The proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment] apply to all invasions
on the part of the government and its employks of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the brealing of his
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of

personal security, personal liberty and private property ....

Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649
(1980); EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 469 (3d ed., 1984). Because

the framers intended the amendment as a restraint only on "the activities of the
sovereign authority," the Fourth Amendment does not protect against wrongful
acts by private persons. Id. at 469.
'U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885). Boyd decided the constitutionality of a statute that provided that "in all suits and proceedings, other than
criminal proceedings, arising under the revenue laws of the United States, the
court, upon motion by the attorney representing the United States, could issue a
notice to the defendant or claimant to produce books, invoices and papers which,
in the judgment of the United States, will tend to prove any allegation made by
the United States." Id. at U.S. 619-20. The statute further provided that in the
event that such books, invoices or papers were not produced, the allegations made
in the motion shall be taken as confessed. Id. at 620.
Petitioner Boyd had notice served on him for the production of certain invoices. Id. at 618. He produced the invoices but challenged the constitutionality of the
statute on fourth and fifth amendment grounds. Id. The government maintained
that the statute did not violate the Constitution because it did not authorize the
search and seizure of books and papers, but merely required their production. Id.
at 621. The Court rejected the government's contention and held the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 638.
The Boyd Court asserted that 'constitutional provisions for the mcurity of
person and property should be liberally construed [because a] close and literal
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation
of the right ....
" Id. at 635. Accordingly, the Court ruled that while the statute
did not authorize the seizure of any tangible items or a physical intrusion, "it
accomplishe[d] the substantial object" of such a seizure and, therefore, was subject
to fourth amendment scrutiny. Id. at 622.
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That description gave rise to three disparate lines of cases
proclaiming that privacy, liberty and property, respectively,
were the central focus of the Fourth Amendment." Courts
"1See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (focusing fourth amendment analysis on privacy); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (focusing fourth
amendment analysis on liberty); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
(focusing Fourth Amendment analysis on property). The Court's decision in Boyd
contributed substantially to this ensuing confusion. Boyd established that government action need not involve a physical taking or intrusion to be subject to fourth
amendment scrutiny. POLYVIOU, supra note 7, at 16; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635. Rather, "'any measure, regardless of its form, which accomplishes the same result' as a
conventional search will come within the gambit of the Fourth Amendment and be
evaluated according to its standard" POLYVIOU, supra note 7, at 16 (citing Boyd,
116 U.S. at 635).
In arriving at its decision, the Boyd Court adopted the reasoning of a British
case from 1765, Entick v. Carrington, referring to that case as a "monument of
English freedom" and as "the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law."
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626. Entick involved a forcible entry into a home and an exhaustive search of of its contents, including an examination of private papers. The
search was conducted by government officials and authorized by a warrant issued
by the Secretary of State. Lord Camden, pronouncing the judgment of the court,
harshly condemned the search. According to Camden, people enter into society to
secure their property. That security, he asserted, is "sacred and incommunicable in
all instances where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law
for the good of the whole." Id. at 627. No power to breach that security had been
granted to the Secretary of State, hence the search was illegal.
Both Entick and Boyd were predicated on traditional property law concepts.
The holding in each case was not based on privacy as a value in itself. Rather
Entick, a trespass action, deems the protection of the home to derive exclusively
from the great end for which men entered into society-to secure their property."
Privacy in this context-the security of the home-is an extension of proprietary
interests in the home. According to Lord Camden, "By the laws of England, every
invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set
his foot upon my ground without my license, but he is liable to an action though
the damage be nothing." Id. at 627. The right to exclude the government-i.e., the
right to privacy-then, merely extended the principle that a fundamental property
right is the right to exclude others-even the government. The greater scrutiny
given to government action merely reflects the great disparity in power between
the government and the individual. See POLYVIOU, supra note 7, at 25.
Arguments in Boyd similarly focused on property. Counsel for the government
urged that the statute in question was, in essence, the same as any number of
statutes authorizing the forfeiture of stolen goods. 116 U.S. at 621. The court
rejected this argument, however, emphasizing that the "owner from whom they
were stolen is entitled to their possession . . . [wihereas, by the proceeding now
under consideration, the court attempts to extort from the party his private books
and papers to make him liable for a penalty or to forfeit his [own] property." Id.
at 624 (emphasis added). Again, the issue argued and decided arose from property
rights.
Boyd, thus, established that in some sense fourth amendment protection extends to both privacy and property interests. Exactly what were the property and
privacy interests safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment, and how those interests
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asserting that personal security was the main concern of the
Fourth Amendment focused their fourth amendment inquiries
on govermuental infringements of individual expectations of
privacy.' Courts claiming that personal liberty was the central focus of the amendment concentrated their analyses on
governmental impediments to individuals' freedom of movement.'3 Courts declaring the primacy of property concerns, in
turn, linked invocation of the amendment's protections to government infringement of possessory interests." The resulting
confusion was not resolved by the Supreme Court until its
1984 decision in United States v. Jacobsen.'"
A.

Interests Protected by the Fourth Amendment-United
States y. Jacobsen 6

Jacobsenis significant in three respects. First, it reconciles
the various lines of precedent by distinguishing between
searches and seizures and defining those terms. Second, as a
result of the framework for fourth amendment analysis established in Jacobsen,government infringements on privacy, liberty or property interests trigger fourth amendment protection
independently of one another. 7 Third, Jacobsen's clarification
of the contours of fourth amendment rights provides law enforcement officials with a workable structure to guide their
activities."8
were related, however remained unanswered until the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in United States v. Jacobsen, see infra notes 16-71 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967).

' See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
14 See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1960); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
466 U.S. 109 (1984).

This section draws heavily from the reading of Supreme Court fourth
amendment jurisprudence expounded in Villiam C. Heffeman, Property, Privacy
and the Fourth Amendment, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 633, 637-58 (1994). It adopts
Professor feffernan's analysis and attempts to describe that analysis fully in order
to illuminate the discussion that appears infa at text accompanying notes 153190.
'7 Heffernan, supra note 16, at 637.58.
Jacobsen involved a Federal Express package damaged in the cour'a of shipping. 466 U.S. at 111. Upon discovering the damage, Federal Express employees
examined the contents, pursuant to written company policy. Id. The examination
'

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 61: 507

1. Privacy, Liberty and Property
Writing for the Court in Jacobsen, Justice Stevens stated
that the Fourth Amendment protects two types of expectations,
one involving searches, the other seizures. 9 A '"search' occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
consider reasonable is infringed."' Seizures may involve two
separate interests. A seizure of the person occurs when there is
some meaningful interference, however brief, with an
individual's freedom of movement-i.e., when there is an interference with his or her liberty.2" A seizure of property, in
turn, occurs when there is some meaningful interference with
an individual's possessory interest in that property." Each of
these definitions draws from a separate line of fourth amendment cases.
Stevens drew his definition of search in Jacobsenprimarily
from cases holding that privacy is the central concern of the
Fourth Amendment, especially Katz v. United States.' Katz
involved the admissibility of evidence the FBI procured
through a warrantless wiretap of a telephone from which defendant Katz was suspected of placing bets.2 4 Justice Stewart,
finding for Katz and writing for a majority of the Court, proclaimed that privacy was the main concern of the Fourth
Amendment. According to Stewart:
[The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be

revealed a tube approximately ten inches long, containing a bag filled with white
powder. Id. The Federal Express employees called Drug Enforcement Agency offi.
cials upon discovery of the white powder. Id. Agents were dispatched and performed a field test on trace amounts of the white powder. The test revealed that
the substance was cocaine. Id. at 112. The results of the test was admitted into
evidence. Id. Defendants challenged the admissibility of the test results on the
ground that the test had been conducted without a warrant and, hence, was unreasonable. Id.
Id. at 113.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 113, n.5.
2
Id. at 113.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
24 Id. at 348.
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constitutionally protected.'

Stewart emphasized that a person who enters a phone
booth, shuts the door and "pays the toll that permits him to
place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world. -2 6 Holding that the Fourth Amendment validates such
an expectation of privacy, the Court ruled that the evidence
procured by the surreptitious FBI wiretap violated that expectation and therefore was inadmissibleY
While Katz establishes that privacy is a fourth amendment
concern, the majority admonished that fourth amendment
protection of privacy is neither exclusive nor absolute:
[The Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual
privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its
protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at
all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy
from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of a
person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other
people-is, like the protection of his property and his very life, left
largely to the law of the individual States?8

Justice Stewart did not, however, offer a standard for determining what types of governmental intrusions upon privacy
are condemned by the Fourth Amendment.
The standard for analyzing fourth amendment privacy
claims which has been embraced by subsequent courts appears
in the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in Katz. It is that
standard which is adopted by Justice Stevens in Jacobsen as
the definition of a fourth amendment search. According to
Harlan, in order for fourth amendment protection to attach to
a privacy interest, "there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."!'

21 Id.
28 Id.

at 351-52 (citations omitted).
at 352.

Id, at 359.
2

Id. at 350-51.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). For later opinions embracing
Justice Harlan's standard see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).

Those

majorities, however, did not adopt Justice Harlan's standard in its entirety. Rath-
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Those cases asserting the centrality of liberty to the
Fourth Amendment are also incorporated in Jacobsen. Terry v.
Ohio,"0 decided shortly after Katz, was the first in a line of
cases indicating that liberty is a central fourth amendment
concern. The standards established by these cases are adopted
in Jacobsen as the first prong of Justice Stevens's definition of
seizure.
Terry involved the propriety of a warrantless "stop and
frisk" of two men whom an officer observed engaging in suspicious behavior.31 The Court held that a stop is a fourth
amendment seizure of the person and, therefore, that the actions of the officer should be subjected to fourth amendment
scrutiny.32 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren argued
that "the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment [is] the
reasonableness in all circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security."33 Personal
security was deemed by the Court to encompass the liberty to
move about freely.' Hence, the Court held that a fourth
amendment seizure occurs "when [an] officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained
the liberty of a citizen."35
The broad language used by the Supreme Court in Katz
and Terry to assert the centrality of privacy and liberty to
fourth amendment analysis left unclear the scope of protection
afforded to property interests. Some commentators, in fact,
argued that property interests were protected by the amendment only to the extent that they were implicated by privacy
and liberty concerns." Pre-Katz cases extending fourth
amendment protection to property were thought to have been
overruled." To an extent, those earlier cases were vindicated
by the second prong of Justice Stevens's definition of seizure in
Jacobsen.
er, they focused on the objective prong. see, e.g., id.
30392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
Id. at 16-17, 19.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 19, n.16.
'
37

See Heffernan, supra note 16, at 647.
Id.
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In Jacobsen Justice Stevens expressly stated that a governmental seizure of property invokes the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.' According to Stevens, a seizure of property occurs when governmental authorities exert dominion and
control over property for their own purposes." This definition
reveals reliance on those cases holding that property is the
central concern of the Fourth Amendment.
First in the line of cases asserting the primacy of property
concerns to fourth amendment analysis is Olmstead v. United
States. 40 Olmstead, like Katz, involved the admissibility of
evidence procured through a warrantless telephone wiretap.41
The Olmstead Court held the evidence admissible by reading
the Fourth Amendment restrictively, limiting its scope by reference to its specific historical origins. According to the
Olmstead court, the Fourth Amendment was intended to do no
more than prohibit the government from issuing general warrants and writs of assistance.42
The Court asserted that the amendment achieves its purpose by proscribing warrantless infi-ngements on property
rights.' Based on its determination of the purpose and intended effects of the amendment, the court limited the meaning of search to "actual physical invasion[s] of [a] house or
curtilage for the purpose of making a seizure"" and the
meaning of seizure to the taking of "tangible material effects."45 In the case of wiretapping, "[tihere was no searching"
because "there was no entry of the houses or offices of the
defendants, and there was no seizure, because the evidence
had been secured '%y the sense of hearing.... ."
Olmstead required an infringement of a property interest
by the government in order for the government's actions to be
subjected to fourth amendment scrutiny. While Jacobsen does
not adopt so myopic a view, Justice Stevens's discussion of a
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
"Id.
at 120.
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
' Id.
at 455.
2 Id.
at 449.

Id. See also POLYVIOU, supra note 7, at 23; Heffernan, supra note 16 at 63840.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
"Id.
"

PoLYVIoU, supra note 7, at 22.
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seizure of property derives from traditional tort and property
law concepts, evaluating fourth amendment claims comparably
to Olmstead.4 7 Justice Stevens's standard for whether a seizure has occurred-that dominion and control be exerted to
further interests contrary to those of the property owner-is
identical to the common law definition of conversion.48
2. Privacy, Property and Liberty Are Independent
Interests
By defining searches and seizures and crystallizing the
distinction between the two, Jacobsen made clear that searches
and seizures are separate constitutional events involving distinct constitutional interests.4 9 After Jacobsen it is clear that
privacy, liberty and property are protected by the Fourth
Amendment independently of each other. Katz is an example of

'7

See Jacobsen, 466 U.S at 113, 120.

Id. at 120, n.18. Cf W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 15
(5th ed., 1984) (The intent required to commit a conversion is "an intent to exercise a dominion and control over the plaintiffs goods which is in fact inconsistent
with the plaintiffs rights"); see also, e.g., Poggi v. Scott, 139 P. 815 (1914); Salt
Springs Nat'l Bank v. Wheeler, 48 N.Y. 492 (1872); Fouldes v. Willoughby, 151
Eng. Rep. 1153 (1841), cited in, KEETON, supra. Moreover, Justice Stevens advised
that "concepts of real or personal property law" should be considered when evaluating the reasonableness of a search. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 1660.
"

JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 19:8 (2d ed. 1993). That

searches and seizures are separate events was by no means obvious prior to
Jacobsen. The discussion in Katz appears to assume that there is a difference
between searches and seizures but provides no means by which to distinguish the
two. The Katz court concluded that the wiretapping was a search and that intangible as well as tangible items may be seized. The Court did not reveal its reasoning as to how searches and seizures may be distinguished from one another.
Terry appears to recognize that the two are separate constitutional events but
does not articulate their distinction. While the Olmstead court made a more thorough attempt to distinguish between searches and seizures, its definition assumes
that the two occur as part of a single governmental action. According to the
Olmstead court, a search is "an actual physical invasion of [a] house or curtilage
for the purpose of making a seizure." POLYVIOU, supra note 7, at 22-23. A seizure,
in turn, is the taking of "tangible material effects." Under this rubric, a seizure
cannot take place without a search.
While the inverse need not be true logically, the Court's rationale reveals that
in fact searches and seizures were considered elements of a single governmental
action. The Olmstead court based its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment on
the notion that the amendment was framed exclusively to prohibit the issuance of
general warrants. See generally POLYVIOU, supra note 7, at 23. That basis presumes that searches and seizures are elements of a single action.
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a pure privacy case. A pure liberty case is Tennessee v. Garner.5" A pure property case, finally, is Soldal v. Cook Coun5
ty. 1

No property interest had been infringed in Katz.' The
offending government action was the recording of defendant's
conversations in a public telephone booth by placing a listening
device on top of the booth that intercepted only the defendant's
part of the conversation. According to Justice Stewart, the
government failed to abide by the Fourth Amendment by "electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words
[which] violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth.' The essence of the Court's
holding in Katz is that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy
even when no property interest is implicated.
At issue in Garnerwas the reasonableness of a Tennessee
statute authorizing police officers to employ deadly force on
suspects fleeing the scene of a felony." Edward Garner, a fifteen year old boy who had broken into a home, was killed by
police because he was trying to flee the scene of his crime.'
Garner was not searched nor was any of his property taken. A
necessary threshold inquiry was whether the taking of a life is
a fourth amendment seizure of the person. The court quickly
and unequivocally held that it was. Justice White, writing for
the Court, stated:
Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk
away, he has seized that person. While it is not always clear just
when minimal police interference becomes a seizure, there can be no
question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure

subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amend-

ment.66

The statute was held to violate the Fourth Amendment on the
ground that the deprivation of liberty which it authorized was
unreasonable. No privacy or property interests were involved

6' 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
113 S. Ct. 538 (1992). These examples and the framework of the following
discussion are drawn from Heffernan, supra note 16, at 637-58.
389 U.S. at 353.
',

Id (emphasis added).
Garner, 471 U.S. at 4 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1932)).
rsId. at 6.
6 Id. at 7.
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in Garner.
Soldal was an invocation of the Fourth Amendment based
solely on property interests. The owners of the trailer park in
which the Soldals lived forcibly evicted them from the park by
pulling their trailer free from its moorings and towing it
away.5' Members of the Cook County Sheriffs Department
were present to ensure that the Soldals did not interfere."
Neither the officers nor the owners of the park restricted the
Soldals' freedom of movement, entered their home, looked
through its windows or handled any of the Soldals' effects.
Although no liberty or privacy interests were infringed, the
removal of the home was held to have violated the Fourth
Amendment because the Soldals' possessory interest in their
home was infringed. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice
White asserted that "seizures of property are subject to Fourth
Amendment scrutiny even though no search within the meaning of the Amendment has taken place."9
3. The Practical Value of Jacobsen
By announcing clear definitions of searches and seizures,
Jacobsen establishes a framework within which law enforcement officials can structure their activities. Only those actions
of the government that can be classified as searches or seizures
are subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment."
Clear delineation of what constitutes a search or seizure allows
the police to minimize the risk that evidence they uncover
without a warrant will be inadmissible at trial.
Because searches and seizures, by definition, involve infringements upon the values sought to be protected by the
Fourth Amendment, the warrant requirement seeks to minimize the discretion exercised by law enforcement officials in
executing a search or a seizure.6 To that end, the warrant

67

Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 540.

6' Id.

"Id.
"

POLYVIOU, supra note 7, at 23.
Id. While an in-depth description of the technical requirements for the issu-

ance of a warrant, exceptions to the warrant requirement, and the subtleties of
the exclusionary rule are beyond the scope of this Comment, a brief discussion of
the meaning of Jacobsen for law enforcement is in order.
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specifies the scope of the action to be taken and the manner in
which the search or seizure is to be conducted.' It states with
particularity the place to be searched, describes the item or
thing to be seized, and identifies the officers who will participate in the search and/or seizure.'
The Fourth Amendment also requires that all searches
and seizures be reasonable. Determining the reasonableness of
governmental action in a fourth amendment context requires
inquiry into "whether the totality of the circumstances justified
a particular sort of search or seizure."" Various factors inform that determination. First, "the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests"
must be balanced against the importance of the governmental
interests offered in justification of the intrusion. ' Second, the
circumstances surrounding the seizure must be examined,
including when the seizure is made and how it is carried
out.66 Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable per
se in the absence of exigent circumstances or some other cir-

Searches and seizures must be made pursuant to a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate upon oath or affirmation, usually in an affidavit, by
the officer seeking the warrant that he has probable cause to believe that a par.
ticular search or seizure will reveal evidence of criminal behavior. U.S. CONSr.
amend. IV; see also YALE KA.ISAR & WAYNE P. LAFAVE, El' AL., MODERN CRIMNAL PROCEDURE 214-15 (8th ed. 1994). The magistrate must examine the sworn
statement of the officer to determine whether the facts stated and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom would lead a reasonable person to conclude that there
is a fair probability that the action sought to be taken will reveal particular evidence of criminality. KAMHSAR & LAFAVE, supra, at 214-15. She or he may issue
the warrant only upon finding that such probable cause exists. KAISAR &
LAFAVE, supra, at 215.
128, 139.40 (1990). See also KAMISAR &
2 Horton v. California, 496 U.S.
LAFAVE, supra note 61 at 215-16; HALL, supra note 49, § 44:24.
KAISAR & LAFAVE, supra note 61, at 215-16; HALL, supra note 49, § 44:24.
" Tennesee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985).
s Id. at 8.
"Id. This analysis is, at all times, an objective one. The motivation of the
officer conducting a search or a seizure is not relevant to a determination of
whether his or her actions were reasonable. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397
(1989). As the Graham Court observed: "An officer's evil intentions will not make
a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor
will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force
constitutional." Id at 397. According to the Supreme Court, determinations of
what is objectively reasonable are made by reference to sources outside the Fourth
Amendment such as "concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." United States v. Jacobsen 466
U.S. 109, 122 n-22 (1984).
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cumstance justifying exception to the warrant requirement."
Even where an exception applies, searches and seizures can
only be made upon probable cause and must be reasonable."
In order to discourage lawless police conduct, evidence
procured in violation of the Fourth Amendment is excluded at
trial.6 9 When a particular act can be construed as a search or
a seizure, police officers must act both reasonably and upon
probable cause if they hope to produce evidence helpful in
securing a conviction. None of these strictures apply when the
actions of the government are neither searches nor seizures in
fourth amendment terms. °
The Fourth Amendment does not limit the actions of police
when they are not engaged in searches or seizures because no
interests protected by the amendment are being infringed. The
only limits on their discretion are federal, state and local laws,
the regulations of their individual police departments and their
own consciences. The clear definitions of search and seizure
advanced by Jacobsen, thus, are of practical importance to law
enforcement in that they provide police officers with bright
lines as to how to exercise their power.
B. A Split Among the Circuit Courts:Is the Taking of a
Photograph a FourthAmendment Seizure?
Notwithstanding Jacobsen's substantial clarification of the
scope of the Fourth Amendment, what type of protection the
amendment affords intangible forms of property, such as one's
likeness or the images inside a home, remains in dispute.
Three positions emerge from the circuit courts on the issue of
whether the taking of a photograph is a seizure, each based on
a different fourth amendment interest. 1 The Second Circuit
holds that the taking of a photograph is a fourth amendment

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1990). See also KAMISAR AND
LAFAVE, supra note 61, at 215-16; HAL, supra note 49, § 44:24.
aId.
'
70
71

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 7, 12 (1968).
See, e.g., POLYVIOU, supra note 7, at 25.
See, United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir. 1990) (taking of photo-

graph is a seizure of intangibles and thus violative of the Fourth Amendment);
United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1981) (same); Bills v. Aseltino,
958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992) (taking of photographs not a seizure in fourth
amendment terms).

CHARACTERIZING VIDEOTAPING AS A SEIZURE

19951

seizure based on analogy to wiretapping cases. That court
reads those cases to mean that tangible as well as intangible
property may be "seized."72 The Fourth Circuit asserts that
the taking of a photograph is always a seizure and that the
nature of the seizure depends upon the subject of the photograph. 3 The Sixth Circuit, finally, holds that the taking of
photographs is not a seizure based on the notion that a seizure
requires interference with a possessory interest. 4
1. The Second Circuit Position
The Second Circuit first held that taking a photograph is a
fourth amendment seizure in United States v. Villegas.
Villegas involved the validity of a warrant authorizing agents
to search and photograph, but not to take anything from, a
location suspected of being an operational cocaine factory. 6
Agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration entered the
location surreptitiously.77 Various pieces of evidence supporting the conclusion that the farm was used as a cocaine factory,
including barrels of ether and racks for drying cocaine, were
uncovered and photographed. 8 Defendant Villegas challenged
the admissibility of the photographs, claiming that the warrant
violated the Fourth Amendment because it did not state with
particularity what information the agents could photographically "seize."79 In analyzing Villegas's claim, the court implicitly accepted his premise that the taking of a photograph is a
seizure in fourth amendment terms based on analogy to wiretapping."0 The court reasoned that wiretapping, like photography, involves the interception of intangible property.81 Because wiretapping is subject to fourth amendment scrutiny, the
Villegas court determined that the seizure of intangible evi-

Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1334.
7' Espinoa, 641 F.2d at 166; United States v. Johnson, 452 F.2d 1363 (1971).
74 Bills, 958 F.2d at 707.
-VIillegas, 899 F.2d at 1324.
76 Id. at 1330.
7

Id.

78Id.
7' Id. at 1333-34.
' Id. at 1334-35.
81 Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1335.
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dence through photography should be scrutinized similarly.82
The most significant among the cases classifying conversations as property and wiretaps as seizures are Berger v. New
York' and Katz v. United States.' Berger involved the constitutionality of a New York statute which provided for the
issuance of an ex parte order authorizing the surreptitious
wiretapping of telephone numbers or telegraph lines for up to
sixty days.8" Such orders could issue upon the oath or affumation of one of a number of state officers that reasonable
grounds existed to believe that evidence of a crime could be
obtained through the wiretap.86 Writing for a narrow majority, Justice Clark argued that a "conversation was within the
Fourth Amendment's protections, and that the use of electronic
devices to capture it was a search within the meaning of the
Amendment."" Because the New York statute did not require
a particularized description of what property was sought, and
allowed the wiretapping to go on for two months, it was held to
violate the Fourth Amendment. According to Justice Clark,
"the statute's failure to describe with particularity the conversations sought gives the officer a roving commission to seize
any and all conversations."'
Decided only a few months prior to Katz, Berger set the
stage for the Katz court's holding that an infringement of a
reasonable expectation of privacy is, in itself, prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment. Like Berger, Katz referred to the recording of a conversation as a seizure. The Katz court stated that
"the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items,
but extends as well to the recording of oral state89
ments."

2
"

Id.
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Berger, 388 U.S. at 44.

'Id.

s' Id. at 51 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 59.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
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2. The Fourth Circuit Position
Still photography and the Fourth Amendment was discussed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States
v. Espinoza." Espinoza involved the admissibility of photographs taken without the authorization of a warrant.9
Espinoza was in the business of distributing pornographic
material and was suspected of aiding and abetting in the
transport in interstate commerce of obscene films and magazines involving children.' Police officers entered a warehouse
rented by Espinoza under a warrant authorizing them to
search for records that would show that Espinoza owned such
films and magazines, and moved them in interstate commerce.93 While conducting the search, one of the officers took
photographs of stacks of obscene magazines kept in the warehouse. Espinoza challenged the introduction of the photographs
into evidence on the ground that the taking of the photographs
was not authorized by the warrant and was therefore an unconstitutional seizure.9 4
In an exceptionally unclear discussion, the Espinoza court
accepted the position that the taking of a photograph constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure." The court offered no
basis for its conclusion that a seizure is effected by photography. It did, however, point out that the nature of a photographic seizure depends upon what is photographed. Where objects
are photographed, the seizure is of property?' Where a person
is photographed, it is a seizure of the person in Fourth Amendment termsY

'

2

641 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 162.
1*
Id. at 156.

13 1d.

94 Id. at 162.
at 166.
" Id.
Espinoza, 641 F.2d at 166.

Id. The Espinoza court cites to United States v. Johnson, 452 F.2cl 1363
(D.C. Cir. 1971) in support of this proposition. Id. Johnson, however, is not on
point as. it addresses the propriety of forcing a suspect to po= for a photograph

and not the characterization of the photograph itself. See Johncon, 452 F.2d at
1371-72.
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3. The Sixth Circuit Position
In contrast to the Second and Fourth Circuits, the Sixth
Circuit's position is that the taking of a photograph is not a
seizure. That conclusion was reached in Bills v. Aseltine.98
Bills involved the admissibility of photographs taken by a
person the police had invited to accompany them on a search of
the Bills' residence.9 The invitee, William Meisling, was a
security officer at General Motors. The police invited Meisling
to accompany them in the hope that he could identify stolen
General Motors' property which the officers suspected was in
the Bills' home."' The search uncovered large quantities of
what appeared to be General Motors parts and equipment in
the basement. Meisling took 231 photographs of the parts and
equipment.101 The Bills' challenged the admissibility of the
photographs claiming, in part, that the photographs were unconstitutional seizures because they were not authorized by
the search warrant.'
The court flatly rejected this contention based on reasoning much like that employed by Justice Stevens in Jacobsen.
Although Bills was decided before Jacobsen, the seeds of the
distinction between search and seizure expounded in Jacobsen
had already been sown. The Bills court drew its conclusions
from those seeds. In Arizona v. Hicks,0 3 the Supreme Court
had found that writing down the serial numbers of stereo
equipment suspected of having been stolen was not a seizure
because it "did not 'meaningfully interfere' with [a] possessory
interest in either the serial numbers or the equipment."" 4
Drawing from that holding, the Bills court concluded that "the
recording of visual images of a scene by means of photography
does not amount to a seizure because it10does
not 'meaningfully
5
interfere' with any possessory interest."

98 958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992).
" Id. at 699-700.
10 Id.
at 700.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 707.
03 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
104

Id.

at 324 (citation omitted).

105 Bills, 958 F.2d at 707.
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H. AYENI v. MOTTOLA

A. Facts
On March 5, 1992, Secret Service agent James Mottola
secured a warrant empowering himself and "any Authorized
Officer of the United States," to enter the home of Babatunde
Ayeni and search for evidence of credit card fraud.' That
evening several Secret Service agents arrived at the Ayeni
home, knocked on the door and announced that they were
police officers conducting an investigation." When Mrs.
Ayeni cracked open the door to her apartment, one agent
pushed her in the chest while two others slammed the door
open.' Six agents barreled into the Ayeni home and began
searching it.' Babatunde Ayeni was not at home. Only Mrs.
Ayeni and her preschool-age son were present."*
Mrs. Ayeni asked to be shown a search warrant and was
told that the agents were waiting for others who would bring
it."' Twenty five minutes later, Agent Mottola arrived with
the warrant, several other Secret Service agents and a camera
crew from CBS's Street Stories." The CBS crew operated a
video camera and sound-recording devices as they entered the
Ayeni home. One secret service agent wore a wireless
3
microphone."
Mrs. Ayeni objected to the videotaping and tried to shield
her face with a magazine."4 The boy cried and told his mother that he was frightened. When Mrs. Ayeni attempted to cover
her son's face with the magazine, Mottola grabbed the magazine out of her hand, threw it to the floor, and told them both
to "shut up.""5 Then, he or another of the Secret Service

" Ayeni 1, 35 F.3d at 683.
107 Id.
os
'0'

Id.
Id.

no Id. at 683.

IId. It is unclear whether the agents suspended their earch at this time. Id.
m Ayeni HI, 35 F.3d at 683.
"

United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 152 (ED.N.Y. 1992). This

the criminal trial of Babatumde Ayeni.
n' Ayeni H, 35 F.3d at 683.
us Id.

was
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agents directed the camera crew to tape Mrs. Ayeni's face. Mrs.
Ayeni objected no further, believing that116the camera crew was
part of the team executing the warrant.
Mrs. Ayeni was questioned about the whereabouts of her
husband and about how the Ayenis could afford several expensive watches found in the apartment." 7 The interrogation
was recorded on videotape.1 In addition, the crew videotaped the agents' search of the apartment, and personal effects
of the Ayeni's including books, photographs, financial
Throughout the search,
statements and personal letters.'
the agent wearing the microphone answered questions posed
by the CBS crew. 20 When the search was concluded, while
standing in the foyer of the apartment, he detailed "the modus
operandi of people who commit credit card fraud."'21 Finally,
he led the crew out of the apartment, expressing his disappointment that the search uncovered nothing. In all, the crew
taped for approximately twenty minutes."2
B. The DistrictCourt Decision
Tawa and Kayode Ayeni brought suit against CBS and
Mottola alleging fourth amendment violations. The plaintiffs
argued that the search exceeded the limits of the Fourth
Amendment in that the access of the camera crew was compelled by government officials, the camera crew was not present for any legitimate law enforcement purpose, and the crew
"took from the home for the purpose of broadcasting them to
the world at large, pictures of intimate secrets of the household, including sequences of a cowering mother and child resisting videotaping."123

Both Mottola and CBS moved to dismiss on the ground of
qualified immunity. 24 Mottola claimed that his conduct did
"' Ayeni I, 848 F. Supp. at 365.
..Ayeni II, 35 F.3d at 683.
: Id.
U

Id.

at 688.

,' United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 151-52.
2
Ayeni I, 848 F. Supp. at 364. The complaint also charged that "the officials
had themselves obtained consentless entry, ostensibly by means of a search warrant." Id.
1'2 Id. While Congress had not expressly created a remedy for violations of
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not violate any "clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person should have known" and,
alternatively, that it was objectively reasonable for him to

believe that his conduct did not violate clearly established
rights.' CBS, in turn, argued that if, as plaintiffs alleged,
the camera crew was acting with the permission of government

agents, they should be entitled to the same qualified immunity
enjoyed by those government officials.

6

Mottola's motion to dismiss was denied on the ground that
clearly developed fourth amendment principles establish that a

search of a home cannot exceed the limits set by the warrant
authorizing the search.' According to the court, because expectations of privacy are greater in the home than almost
anywhere else, the government's ability to enter the home is
sharply restricted by the Fourth Amendment." Only urgent
governmental interests will justify intrusion into the home.'
The court asserted that the Fourth Amendment further requires that even when the government possesses sufficient
justification to enter the home, agents of the government must
ensure that the interruption of privacy occasioned by them is
minimized. 30 In furtherance of that purpose, agents are

constitutional rights by federal agents, a cause of action for such violations was
inferred to exist by the Supreme Court in Bivens u. Sbx Unhnown Nand Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Damages against state officers for similar violations may be
granted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute provides, in relevant part,
that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for retress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
The standards for imposing liability on government agents are substantially
the same for both federal and state agents. In both cases it is necessary to determine whether clearly established principles exist such that the officer could reasonably believe that she acted in good faith. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967). Where such reasonable beliefs exist, agents are immune from personal
liability.
" Ayeni I, 848 F. Supp. at 365.
at 367.
'2' Id.
n' Id. at 366.
129

Id. at 367.
Id. at 366.

'o

Id. Thus, searches may not be unreasonably destructive, United States v.

'.
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bound to adhere strictly to the limits of the warrant authorizing their entry. 3 '
The court concluded that Mottola violated the Fourth
Amendment when, notwithstanding the absence of authorization in the warrant, he allowed the CBS camera crew to enter
the Ayeni home and videotape the search.'32 According to the
court, a reasonable official would have understood that inviting
persons to the execution of a search warrant, exclusively "so
that they could titillate and entertain others was beyond the
scope of what was lawfully authorized by the warrant."133
Likening Mottola's actions to those of "a rogue policeman using
his official position to break into a home in order to steal objects for his own profit or that of another,"'" the court denied
his motion to dismiss.
CBS's claims were similarly rejected. The court held that
CBS's claim of immunity was meritless and that its actions
violated the Fourth Amendment.'35 According to the court,
"qualified immunity... acts to safeguard the government, and
thereby to protect the public at large, not to benefit its
agents." 3 ' CBS therefore could not benefit from qualified
immunity even though it was acting under color of official
right.'37 Rather, its actions would be subjected to fourth
amendment scrutiny.
Application of fourth amendment standards to CBS's action resulted in the court's denial of the motion to dismiss. The
court held that the videotaping was a seizure of the images of
the Ayeni household without permission or official right and
therefore violated the Fourth Amendment." s The crew's presence in the Ayeni home was not authorized by the warrant,
Becker, 929 F.2d 442 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 862, 112 S. Ct. 183 (1991);
agents may only search in areas that could reasonably contain the items specified
in the warrant, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); and, those searching
may not remain on the premises for an unreasonable length of time after the
search is complete, United States v. Corrado, 803 F. Supp. 1280, 1285 (M.D. Tenn.
1992). Id.
1" Ayeni 1, 848 F. Supp. at 366.
132 Id.
w Id.

at 368.

Id.
Id.
I'
Id. at 367 (citation omitted).
13 Ayeni I, 848 F. Supp. at 368.

134
136

I3
Id.
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served no legitimate law enforcement purpose and was not
consented to by Mrs. Ayeni." 9
C. The Second Circuit Decision40
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
addressed the plaintiffs' claims that Mottola's actions violated
the Fourth Amendment in that "(a) the Ayenis' privacy was
invaded by the presence of unauthorized persons in their home
and (b) the conduct of the search was excessively intrusive." 4 ' The Second Circuit stated that the fundamental objective of the Fourth Amendment is to ensure "the protection of
privacy from encroachment by government officers"" 2 and
that private dwellings are ordinarily afforded the most stringent fourth amendment protection." 3 Determination of when
a warrant will be issued and how it will be executed therefore
44
rests with judicial, rather than law enforcement, officers,1
with the actions of officers executing a warrant narrowly limited to those expressly or impliedly authorized by the warrant.145 Like the district court, the circuit court found that
Mottola exceeded the bounds of well-established principles
when he brought into the Ayeni home persons whose presence
was neither authorized by the warrant nor served any legitimate law enforcement purpose. 6 Thus, the court held that
"an objectively reasonable officer could not have concluded that
inviting a television crew-or any third party not providing
was
assistance to law enforcement-to participate in a search
4
in accordance with Fourth Amendment requirements."" 7
Similarly, the court held that the search violated the
Fourth Amendment in that it was excessively intrusive. "'

Id. at 368.
1.0 Because CBS arrived at a settlement with the Ayenis, Agent Mlottola was
the only party to appeal. The terms of the settlement between CBS and the
Ayenis were not disclosed.
'

141

Ayeni 1l,35 F.2d at 684.

142 Id.

11

Id. at 685.

'it Id.

.. Id. at 685.
146 Id.

-7

at 686.
Ayeni I, 35 F.2d at 686.

1a

Id. at 688.
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The court noted that searches involving documents, like that in
Ayeni, must be conducted in a manner that "minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.""' Agent Mottola flaunted
that requirement. The court found the intrusion was aggravated, rather than minimized, by two factors. First, private documents were viewed by "unauthorized persons with no business
being in the home at all."'5° Second, the court asserted that
"[tihe video and sound recordings were 'seizures' under the
Fourth Amendment, and rendered the search far more intrusive than it needed to be."'51 The court offered no justification
for its conclusion that videotaping was a seizure other than
stating its agreement with the district court's finding."2
III. THE RIGHT RESULT FOR THE WRONG REASONS

The significance of the Second Circuit's decision in Ayeni
lies in the reasoning of the court rather than the result. The
Ayeni decision was correct to the extent that it validated expectations of privacy which attach to the home. The failure of
Ayeni is that its conclusion is based partially on the characterization of the videotaping by the CBS camera crew as a
fourth amendment seizure. This characterization perpetuates a
split among the circuits which should be resolved in favor of
the Sixth Circuit position. Videotaping is neither a seizure of
property, as the Second Circuit held in Ayeni and Villegas, nor
is it a seizure of the person, as the Fourth Circuit seems to assert.
The Supreme Court established in Jacobsen that a seizure
of property requires an interference with that property akin to
conversion.' An image not fixed in tangible form is not
property. But even assuming that it is, the videotaping is not a
seizure because it does not interfere with any possessory interest. Therefore, the Second Circuit's characterization is incorrect. The Fourth Circuit position is also flawed. Jacobsen es-

. Id. at 688 (citation omitted).
150 Id.

151Id.
"2 Id. The Circuit court remanded the case only for jury determination of
whether Mottola was present and played a role in permitting the CBS news crew
to be present at the search. Id. at 689, n.11.
"5 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 121 (1984).
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tablished that a seizure of the person requires an interference
with liberty." Because freedom of movement is in no way
impeded by the taking of a photograph, a photograph is not a
seizure of the person.
The danger of Ayeni, Villegas and Espinoza is that they
have the potential of raising impediments for law enforcement
without in any way furthering the values protected by the
Fourth Amendment. Mischaracterizing photography and
videography as seizures undermines effective law enforcement.
Photography and video surveillance of known criminals in
public places are invaluable to police efforts to derail criminal
organizations."s These tools allow police to identify such
organizations' members and structure." If photographs are
construed to be fourth amendment seizures, however, police
surveillance activities will be thwarted; after Jacobsen, a seizure of property-here the image of a person-triggers fourth
amendment protection notwithstanding the absence of infringements of privacy or liberty interests. All evidence procured through warrantless videotaping by police could be excluded, not just the videotaping of a person inside his or her
home but videotaping of persons interacting in public.
A better approach to the concerns raised in Ayeni would be
to characterize videotaping as a search. This approach is consistent with precedent and does not unduly impede use of
videotaping by police where the subject lacks a reasonable
expectation of privacy. At the same time, however, this approach would curb abusive invasions of privacy like the one in
Ayeni.
M

A. The Right Result
Ayeni is correct to the extent that it vindicates the inviolability of the home. The primacy of the home to American
society prompted its express inclusion in the Fourth
Amendment. A home, by definition, is endowed with sufficient
attributes of privacy that intrusion into it cannot be undertak-

" Id. at 113, n.5.
56

JAMES G. CARE, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 1.2 (1995).

156 Id.
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en lightly.157 "[The right of a man to retreat into his own
home" has, in fact, been deemed to stand "at the very core of
the Fourth Amendment.""8 The evolution of the rule that a
warrantless entry into a home is unreasonable per se is further
testament to that primacy.'5 9
The warrant and reasonableness requirements of the
Fourth Amendment suffice to condemn Mottola's actions. The
unreasonableness of facilitating entry by the camera crew into
the Ayeni home is manifest. As both the district and circuit
courts noted, the presence of the crew and the taping were
neither authorized by the warrant nor were they necessary to
some legitimate law enforcement purpose. 6 ' Mottola blatantly and unjustifiably disregarded the limits of the warrant.
The nature and quality of the fourth amendment interest
infringed in Ayeni is dear-the privacy of the home. That interest was defiled both by the presence in the home of the camera
crew, and the videotaping, intended for nationwide broadcast.
No justification was offered for the presence of the camera
crew or the taping.' It is, in fact, difficult to imagine circumstances in which one could have been. One is hard-pressed
to identify a governmental interest which would suffice to
justify the government's providing one citizen with the ability
to profit at the expense of another's constitutional rights. Because the home is endowed with significant privacy interests,
any intrusion into it must be justified by a governmental interest which outweighs the reasonable expectation of privacy
maintained by the dwellers of the home. No such interest was
offered by the government in Ayeni, hence its actions violated
the Fourth Amendment.

...Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 545 (1992); Ayeni H, 35 F.3d at 684.
188 Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 543.

159 Other examples abound. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 497 (1960)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). The notion that the home is inviolable was articulated in
Entick v. Carrington in a passage worth quoting- "The poorest man may in his
cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail-its roof may
shake--the wind may blow through it-the storm may enter, the rain may enter,
but the King of England may not enter-all his forces dare not cross the threshold
of the ruined tenement!" 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765) (quoted in Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
o Ayeni II, 35 F.3d at 685-86; Ayeni I, 848 F. Supp. at 368.
161 Ayeni II, 35 F.3d at 687; Ayeni I, 848 F. Supp. at 368.
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B. The Wrong Reasons
While the results reached in Ayeni may be proper, its
means are inherently flawed. The position that videotaping
effects a fourth amendment seizure is incorrect. Neither the
reasoning of the Second Circuit nor that of the Fourth Circuit
withstands scrutiny. Supreme Court jurisprudence and the
words of the amendment itself require the conclusion that
photography and videotaping effect neither seizures of property
nor seizures of the person in fourth amendment terms.
1. Videotaping Is Not a Seizure of Property
The Ayeni court makes no reference to Jacobsen in arriving at its conclusion that the videotaping by the CBS crew was
a seizure. Rather, the court bases its holding on Berger and
Katz. To be sure, Berger and Katz both characterize conversations as property subject to eizure. Analysis of the rationales advanced for the disposition of those cases, in light of the
framework for judging fourth amendment claims established
by Jacobsen, however, reveals that neither conversations nor
images may be seized in fourth amendment terms.
The language employed in Berger and Katz belies those
opinions' extension to the proposition that images may be
seized because both decisions are based on the premise that
wiretapping in specific circumstances is an unreasonable invasion of privacy. Notwithstanding various references by the
Berger court to the seizure of conversations, the essence of the
holding in Berger is that a statute which authorizes police to
tap telephone lines for months on end is a general search proscribed by the Fourth Amendment. Berger did not proclaim the
existence of a constitutionally protected possessory interest in
a conversation as such. Rather, it condemned the means by
which conversations were intercepted in that case. The Court's
opinion was predicated on its judgment that "the use of electronic devices to capture [conversations] was a search within
the meaning of the Amendment. "1" It was the invasion of

162 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 353 (1967).
16 Berger, 388 U.S. at 51 (emphasis added).

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61: 607

privacy authorized by the New York statute which was an
affront to the Fourth Amendment.
The decision in Katz rests on the same foundation. The
government infringed the Fourth Amendment in Katz by exposing a conversation which the defendant sought to keep
private and could reasonably expect would be kept private. The
decision is not concerned with any seizure of property. It was
because "[tihe Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied"' that the Fourth Amendment was violated.
It is plain that after Jacobsen the governmental actions of
the type complained of in Berger and Katz are not fourth
amendment seizures. Both Berger and Katz point to infringements of privacy interests.'65 Jacobsen makes clear that privacy interests are protected by the prohibition of unreasonable
searches, not unreasonable seizures.'
Even assuming that words 6r images are property in some
sense, no seizure under the Jacobsen definition is effected by
recording a conversation or taking a photograph. In order to
effect a seizure after Jacobsen, an infringement of a possessory
interest is necessary. Recording a conversation or taking a
photograph is no such infringement. The content of a conversation is not affected because it is recorded. Observation of images, similarly, does not affect those images. They are not somehow changed because they are being observed; nor is ownership of them affected, if such ownership can be deemed to
exist. The tape recorder and camera are merely extensions of
the senses which fix in tangible form what could otherwise be
recalled from memory.
This analysis is similar to that employed by the Sixth
Circuit in Bills. The Bills court took heed of the Supreme
Court's admonition in Arizona v. Hicks that a seizure requires
some meaningful interference with a possessory interest. Accordingly, the Bills court concluded that "the recording of visual images of a scene by means of photography does not amount
to a seizure because it does not 'meaningfully interfere' with

164

Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added).

I" Id. at 353.
"'

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
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any possessory interest."6 " Again, recording of a scene does
not affect that scene.
The conclusions of Bills and Jacobsen are eminently sensible. Only takings of property traditionally have been considered seizures." As pointed out by Justice Black in his dissent in Berger, the Fourth Amendment proscribes only unreasonable seizures of "persons, houses, papers, and effects." "This
literal language imports tangible things."'C Certainly, technological advances have increased the intrusiveness of surveillance. That increased intrusiveness, however, does not justify
broad7 0 deviation from the constitutional definition of seizure.

2. Videotaping Is Not a Seizure of the Person
The Fourth Circuit's assertion that a photograph is somehow a seizure of the person similarly cannot withstand scrutiny. The standard embraced by the Supreme Court in Jacobsen,
and cases from which the Jacobsen standard is drawn, require
the conclusion that the taking of a photograph does not constitute a fourth amendment seizure.
Under Jacobsen, a seizure of the person occurs where
there is some meaningful interference with that person's liberty. 71 The value which the Fourth Amendment safeguards in
this respect is the right of every individual to move about freely and without restraint by the government. 72 In an individual case, when interference with liberty becomes a seizure may
not be ascertained easily.' Examples of when a seizure occurs range from the extreme and obvious-killing an individual-to the much slighter interference of preventing a person
from moving from an area where he or she is encountered by
police.'74 The standard in all cases, however, is the same: the
' Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 707 (6th Cir. 1992):
"s Berger, 388 U.S. at 78 (Burger, J., dissenting).
169Id.
170 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 26 (1985) (O'Connor, J., diszenting).
171 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113, n.5.
1

See generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Cupp v. Murphy, 412

U.S. 291 (1973); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968).
7 Terry, 392 U.S. at 9-10.
17 Compare Garner, 471 U.S. 1 with Terry, 392 U.S. L
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conclusion that a seizure of the person has occurred rests on a
finding that his ability to move about has been impeded by the
exertion of governmental authority. The Terry Court, for example, stated: "Only when the officer, by means of physical force
or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of
a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." 7 ' In
short, a seizure of the person is not some esoteric event; it requires the government to prevent a person from walking away.
Snapping a photograph of an individual or recording her image
with a video camera obviously does not act as a physical bar to
that person's movements. It therefore cannot be construed to
be a fourth amendment seizure of the person.
C. The Consequences of Ayeni for Law Enforcement and a
Better Approach
Mischaracterizing videotaping and photography as a seizure places unjustifiable impediments in the way of law enforcement and leads to absurd results. After Jacobsen, a seizure is actionable by itself.'76 Police officers would be required to comply with the Fourth Amendment even absent an
infringement of the privacy and liberty interests of those being
observed. The fruits of surveillance, even of public places,
therefore could be excluded from trial. Absurdly, officers directly observing suspects in public could later testify as to what
they saw, notes made by the officers could be introduced into
evidence, but the more reliable methods of chronicling the
movements of suspects, such as photography and videotaping,
would be excluded as impermissible fourth amendment seizures.

"'

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16 (1968).
See Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S.Ct. 538 (1992).
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1. The Consequences for Law Enforcement 1 "
Labelling photography and videotaping as fourth amendment seizures has the potential of unjustifiably undermining
effective law enforcement. Photographic evidence, currently
heavily relied upon in prosecution, will likely be excluded in
many circumstances, even when the evidence is secured without a violation of a privacy or liberty interest. This hindrance
inappropriately attaches regardless of where a seizure takes
place: a photograph taken on the street is just as much a seizure as a photograph taken after warrantless entry into a
home. Curtailing police in this context is unnecessary because
the values sought to be protected by the Fourth Amendment
are not furthered.
Photography and videotaping in public places are especial-

17 Consideration of the burdens on law enforcement is of no less importance to
fourth amendment analysis as is consideration of individual liberties. The Fourth
Amendment highlights the balance sought to be achieved by the framers of the
Constitution between the rights of the individual and the powers of government. It
is a balance between freedom and order. Chief Justice Rehnquist has argued
convincingly that ensuring that law enforcement is fair and effective is central to
that balance. According to Rehnquist:
In a society as populous and complex as ours, with the vast number of
laws designed to regulate the lives of all of us, voluntary compliance
with those laws is a virtually indispensable condition to a law abiding
society. The great disadvantage of making the laws any more difficult to
enforce than they now are is that it tends to make a sucker or a chump
of the citizen who obeys the law because he feels he ought to obey it. It
lessens the pressure to obey the law that is felt by the not
inconsiderable number of us who are law abiding not out of a sense of
moral duty but out of a fear of being caught if we transgress. As to that
class, diminution in the effectiveness of the sanction will decrease the
propensity to obey the law.
William H. Rehnquist, Privacy, You've Come a Long Way Baby: Is an Expanded
Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Efficient Law Enforcement?, 23 KAN. L.
REV. 1, 19 (1974).
Another Chief Justice described the situation thus: 'Civil liberties, as
guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses
of unrestrained abuses." Id. at 22 (quoting Chief Justice Hughes writing for the
majority in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941)). In fourth amendment terms this balance is that between the core values which the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect and the ability of police to search and saeze in a manner
consistent with the Amendment. For more on this subject se R.N. BMW,
SEcuRriy AND SocaI"y (1986).
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ly important to investigations of offenses such as gambling,
loan sharking or drug trafficking."' These crimes generally
are committed by networks of criminals working together and
are characterized by the involvement of consenting participants rather than victims.'79 Police therefore are faced with a
lack of people willing to provide them with information. 8 '
Photography and videotaping allow police not only to identify
the members of these organizations but also to determine the
structure of the organization by observing who meets with
" '
whom and the frequency with which such meetings occur.18
The goal of police photography and videotaping is for the
photographs or videotapes to be admitted into evidence. Such
documentation provides the jury with accurate visual records
of the connections among defendants that must be established
if a criminal organization is to be derailed. The cliche that "a
picture is worth a thousand words" is especially true for the
prosecution of organized crime members. Photographic evidence illustrating connections among defendants establishes
those connections in a way that mere testimony does not. If
videotaping is mischaracterized as a seizure, however, even
where photographs are taken in public places, they will not be
admitted in many circumstances. A seizure is a seizure whether it occurs in the Ayeni living room or on the street among a
crowd of people. Police officers seeking to take photographs or
videotape suspects in public places will have to be able to demonstrate probable cause to do so or risk exclusion of the evidence they obtain through videotaping. 8 2
It is the requirement that probable cause be present before
a seizure may be effected that will preclude introduction of
much photographic evidence. The American system of criminal
justice gives law enforcement the burden of gathering the information that may lead to a conviction for the commission of a
18 CARR, supra note 155, § 1.2(b). Cf. EDITH J. LAPIDUS, EAVESDROPPING ON
TRIAL 203 (1974). On police surveillance powers and the implications of techno-

logical advances on Fourth Amendment concerns see Michael Goldsmith, Eavesdropping Reform: The Legality of Roving Surveillance, 65 U. ILL. L. REV. 401
(1987); Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty.First
Century, 65 IND. L. J. 549 (1990).
79 LAPIDUS, supra note 178, at 203.
," LAPIDUS, supra note 178, at 203.
...CARR, supra note 155, § 1.2(b).
..
2 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968).
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crime."8 When police begin a criminal investigation, they frequently do not have probable cause to search any place, arrest
anyone or seize anything."' The entire purpose of the investigation is to provide them with sufficient information to give
them probable cause either to search or seize." Due to the
absence of probable cause, even photographs taken in public
places will often be excluded from evidence.
A simple hypothetical illustrates the absurd results of
characterizing videotaping as a seizure. A police officer, acting
on a hunch, follows someone whom the officer believes is involved in an illegal gambling operation. The officer observes
the suspect meeting with three people known to be involved in
illegal gambling, once in a public restaurant, once in a park
and once on the street. The suspect later is indicted for his
involvement in the operation run by the other three. The officer can testify to observing meetings between the suspect and
each of the other three, but the more reliable record of the
meetings-photographs or videotape-may not be admitted
into evidence. It can be argued that a seizure without probable
cause, an unreasonable seizure, was effected.
Ayeni presents a particularly outrageous set of facts: a
reckless police officer with a camera crew in tow, acting out a
Rambo-like fantasy at the expense of a mother and her child.
The officer's behavior amounted to nothing more than cheap
theatrics, properly condemned. But the legitimate purposes for
which most officers in most instances use cameras are curbed
by the Ayeni holding as well. Photographs of a suspected felon,
sitting in a restaurant open to the public or suspected drug
dealers meeting in a public park may not be admitted into
evidence. Photographs chronicling daily meetings on public
streets by high-ranking members of organized crime similarly
may not be admitted.
The absurdity of the mischaracterization is that it furthers
no values the Fourth Amendment protects. That no privacy
interest is furthered plainly follows from the definitions of
privacy established in Jacobsen.A seizure has nothing whatso-

'

Rehnquist, supra note 177, at 10.

lu Id.

6 Id.
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ever to do with privacy.'8 6 Liberty is similarly not expanded
by the characterization because videotaping or photographing a
person does not physically restrain him. Finally, fourth
amendment property concerns are not furthered by characterizing a videotaping as a seizure. Restrictions on appropriations
of property were intended to ensure that the government did
not use its powers to infringe upon the property rights of its
citizens under the pretext of seeking to enforce the law. This
prohibition ensures that no possessory interests are meaningfully interfered with by the government.'87 Images cannot be
classified as property. Moreover, even if they could be, recording by police, exclusively for law enforcement purposes, does
not meaningfully interfere with one's ownership of those images.
2. A Better Approach
A better approach to the issues raised in Ayeni would be to
characterize videotaping as a fourth amendment search rather
than a seizure. Such a characterization is consistent with precedent and does not unduly impede the use of videotaping by
police. At the same time, it prevents abuses by either law enforcement officers or those acting pursuant to their authority.
What is objectionable about the filming of what transpired
in Ayeni is not that the filming infringed some possessory
interest which Tawa and Kayode Ayeni had in their images or
the images of the inside of their home; it is the violation of the
sanctity of their home that is objectionable. The Ayenis expected that when they entered their home and closed the door
behind them their actions would not be monitored. In short,
they had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Videotaping the
search of their home violated that expectation. Because the
videotaping threatened to expose to the world that which Tawa
and Kayode Ayeni sought to preserve as private, the videotaping was objectionable." Under the definitions established in
Jacobsen, such a violation of privacy is a search, not a sei-

'
17

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
See id.
Id.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1968).
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Characterization of videotaping as a search affords the
same degree of protection to citizens as does its characterization as a seizure without unduly limiting the activities of law
enforcement officials. In all cases involving videotaping, the
fundamental question will be the reasonableness of a person's
expectation that his or her image, or those of his or her possessions will not be exposed to the public.' Thus, citizens are
assured that what goes on within their homes, or their hotel
rooms, or their private clubs will not be videotaped. Expectations of privacy in those places will almost always be reasonable.
Police, however, may continue to make use of photography
and videotaping at their discretion, in circumstances where
their subjects cannot reasonably expect privacy. Necessary
evidence procured by police through videotaping will not be
excluded on fourth amendment grounds. In short, if videotaping is characterized as a search, the rights of citizens will receive thorough protection without saddling police with absurd
impediments.
CONCLUSION

In Ayeni, the Second Circuit mischaracterized videotaping
as a seizure, unnecessarily perpetuating a split among the
circuit courts. That characterization is inconsistent with precedent, imposes undue burdens on law enforcement and leads to
absurd results. All of these detriments are avoided if videotaping is characterized as a search, without any attendant
reduction in fourth amendment protection available to citizens.
Antonio Yanez, Jr.

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
" Id.; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); New York v. Berger, 388 U.S. 41,
75 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (The word "unreasonable is "the hey word permeating [the] whole Amendment."). See alco, Amar, supra note 8, at 799.

